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[Vol. 24:4 religion and state. 13 The dismissal of the Muslim Brotherhood's President Morsi cannot be considered a coup d'état because the Egyptian military sided with the will of more than thirty million Egyptians by compelling Morsi to step down, leaving everything to a civilian government, and installing Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mansour to act as an interim President.
14 Technically and legally speaking, coup means that "the army goes on their own, without any invitation [request] from anyone, taking all the power," 15 and although Morsi was forced to leave office because of the army, it cannot be called a coup because it is what the people wanted, and power was placed in a civilian government. 16 In this domain, the conflation of Islam and Islamism has permeated the interpretation of Egypt's ethnic and personal character, leading one legal and political scholar to label the Muslim Brotherhood as "the Muslims" or "Islamic" while calling their opponents "non-Islamic." 17 Islamism is considered a vague politicization of a specific religious attitude throughout the Middle Eastern Arabian World and cannot be associated with Islam as a belief or faith. 18 By the same token, Egypt strongly resents some Western mass-media coverage that overlooks violence and terror attacks committed by Islamist organizations in the form of intimidation and terrorizing citizens. 19 The Egyptian Government, along with Egyptians, are in favor of having a place in a civil democratic Egypt for quiet, peaceful Islamists who would not want to change the State's national character and the form of its government into an Islamic religious theocracy. 20 The scuffle to define and explain the concept of "Islam" in Egypt has a long legal and constitutional history as those who favor political Islam square off against those who prefer a more secular-oriented form of government. 21 Generally speaking, the state's main obligation in any country is to preserve public order and protect and defend its national citizens. This duty is generally difficult to harmonize with the accountability of any non-state dynamic. 22 Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood has incorporated diverse tendencies: from the deeply conservative [traditional and classical]-which have stunned other divisions of Egypt's Muslim society-all the way to neo-religious totalitarianism [particularly under Morsi's leadership]; this incorporation of diverse tendencies has resulted in deep sectarianism and an oppressive style of Islamism among the classes of Egypt. 23 mosques to deliver sermons in support of the government and to "correct the fallacies of extremist thought," in an attempt to promote a true "Egyptian Islam. " ("About eighty to ninety percent of the population is Muslim, while the remainder is Christian. Historically, the Christians have enjoyed freedom of religion, yet they have not always received full equality. In fact, Coptic Christians feel particularly besieged and discriminated against. This identification with nationality first supports the belief that ideological religious radicalism is not likely to take over in the near future.").
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There is political turmoil, violence, and chaos in Egypt, and it must be taken extremely seriously because war on terror under a religious cover, or the umbrella of defending religion or Islam, may permit the state to denyto some extent-the individual's public rights and freedoms. 24 Further, the futile counter-terrorism policies and strategies only serve to reinforce a chronicle of grievance that supports terrorist recruiting. 25 Nonetheless, Egypt remains multifaceted: most "liberals" appear to believe that the alqwaat al-moselah(h) al-masriyyah(h) (Egyptian Army) is a "revolutionary savior," while Islamists acknowledge Morsi as the entire and mutual sign of freedom, justice, and confrontation, and as a sound ideal of democratic leadership; neither are truly in touch with reality. 26 This is why the picture in Egypt is astoundingly contradictory and puzzling. It is obvious that not only do Egyptians see this as a regime-change, but so do other countries' governments.
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To further illustrate the far-reaching effects of the June 30 and July 3 events, this Article contains four parts including the introduction. Part two provides a concise framework establishing the theoretical and ethical underpinnings of Egyptian politics. Then, part three discusses the definition of the relevant religious laws and legislation in Egypt and how they can be enacted under Islamic Late in the night of July 2, Morsi, in his final speech on State National Television, declared that he would "defend the legitimacy of his elected office with his life" and added that "there is no substitute for legitimacy" as he vowed not to resign. 54 As these presumed negotiations failed and the deadline for the army's ultimatum approached on July 3, the military intervened. 55 The Army removed Morsi from power and installed the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Chief Justice Adly Mansour to act as an "Interim President." 56 Upon installation, the Army charged Mansour with launching a transitional technocratic government while also suspending the questionable 2012 Constitution. 57 Morsi condemned his streets today, out of a total population of 84 million. The consensus is that country-wide, the numbers of demonstrators are in the millions."). a 'roadmap' for Egypt's political future proposed by the opposition, which included the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi to make way for snap presidential elections. The roadmap will include the following points: -The temporary suspension of the current constitution.
Alastair Beach & Heather Saul, Egypt on the Edge: Troops Seen Preparing for Unarmed Combat after President Morsi Rebuffs Army 48-hour Coup
-Empowering the head of Egypt's High Constitutional Court ("HCC") to run the country until a new president is elected via early presidential polls.
-Forming a new technocratic government and asking the HCC to hasten the passing of a parliamentary elections law, currently being reviewed by the HCC, to allow for parliamentary elections.
-Forming a committee to amend controversial articles of the temporarily suspended constitution.
-Laying down a media code of ethics to guarantee the media's professionalism.
-Forming a committee to foster 'national reconciliation.' -Taking immediate steps to include youth in decision making circles.
In his televised statement, [the strongest Defense Minister, General] El-Sisi stressed that the armed forces had no intention to enter political life, but said it would 'never turn a blind eye to the aspirations of the Egyptian people.'"). In this regard, Morsi was put under house arrest, and was believed to be at a safe undisclosed military base and his travel was restricted and standing for criminal investigations and trial. [ 65 The Army made it obvious that they were dispassionate in taking over political power, only wanting to make sure that Egypt and its people remain stable and safe and that those involved in the political arena find an agreed political solution which satisfies the needs and wishes of the Egyptians. According to the Supreme Constitutional Principles within the Egyptian legal framework the Head of State cannot be removed from power expect by majority approval of the People's Assembly. 75 This principle has been confirmed in the various Constitutions through Egypt's history, including the latest de facto 2012 Constitution. 76 In light of these constitutional standards and legal legitimacy, a President of the Republic should only be impeached if she commits a heinous criminal act, high treason, or equivalent acts related to the national security or public interests of the State. 77 In these cases, the Speaker of the Parliament will act as an "Interim President," or, if the Parliament has dissolved, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court will be installed as an "Acting President." 78 Therefore, the President will not be able to carry out any of his or her presidential powers as a "temporary barrier" until the trial, verdict, and sentence, regulated by the Constitution and the Penal Code, are reached. 79 Once this "impeachment request" is issued by the required voting members in the Senate, the President will not be able to resume his presidential commitments as a "permanent or absolute barrier" and must In this domain, the al-qwaat al-moselaah(h) (military) was assisting the general public impeach or overthrow a president in the absence of any legal framework or with the non-existence of any constitutional procedures to do so. 81 This Article holds that removal of the former Islamist President Mohammad Morsi represents a great deal of confusion not only in the West but also in the Arabian region. The reportage and coverage of the events were not based on a thoughtful and comprehensive understanding of the facts in objective terms of Egypt's modern history, specific national identity, or on the recent policies that led to this dramatic action.
Morsi was the first democratically elected civilian President according to official results of the general vote. 82 The Egyptian Constitutional Charter of 2014 states that "Accusing the President . . . of violating the provisions of the Constitution, treason or any other felony must be based on a motion signed by at least the majority of the members of the House of Representatives," and that the motion "shall only be issued by the majority of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives."
83 Further, the Assembly has the authority to withdraw confidence and trust from the President and call for an earlier electionthrough a public referendum. Since there was no independent Parliament until Morsi's ouster, Egypt's Supreme Court dissolved the Parliament on an apparently legal basis, citing a misinterpretation of the law's provisions, the unconstitutionality of rules concerning independent candidates, and laws relating to political rights. 85 Given the absence of a legally and constitutionally adequate instrument to impeach the sitting President, millions of Egyptians turned out to protest against him, asking that he respectfully step-down. 86 At the same time, a national movement called tamarod [repel] collected more than twenty-two million petitions seeking the President's resignation and requesting earlier elections, principally because of the political failures that predicated the January 2011 uprisings.
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In addition, the military submitted to the rule of law because it did not take over power, but promised to implement a road map towards real democracy during this "transitional period," one that included a new constitution and fresh parliamentary and presidential elections. This Article argues that this sort of impeachment cannot be described as a "coup d'etat" in a technical and traditional legal sense. From a Western perspective, it is undoubtedly strange to see a military overthrow a democratically elected President, along with the rest of the government, and install itself as the ruling power while not declaring a coup. What happened on June 30 and July 3 was only military assistance to support Egypt's will to remove the dictatorial Morsi in whom the nation lost confidence and (60) days from the announcement day of the official results and in this case the President will not be able to resume his presidential authorities as a "permanent or absolute barrier" and will be impeached. 121 The making and modeling of new constitutions in the Arab Spring countries has led to a discussion about the role of Islamic law in a democracy. 122 It should be noted that Non-Muslims, such as Coptic Christians in Egypt, are not expected to follow the Islamic norms. In most countries, they are under the jurisdiction of distinctive committees, especially with family law issues, and adjunct courts under government control.
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B. Entirely Materialistic (Secular)
It should be noted that some Muslim countries recognize secular practice and lifestyles in their constitutional charters, including Chad and Tajikistan among others.
124 Secular Muslim nations are a minority, and the admiration of Islamist political parties' victories amongst the people in Muslim nations is tapering the gap between state and religion. 125 In these countries, Islamic values frequently stimulate indigenous customs.
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Generally speaking, Islamist organizations are regularly observed as a potential threat by governments of secular Muslim countries, and thus, these governments often crack down on such political groups and parties. countries, such as Tanzania, the civil courts apply Islamic law or secular law based on the religious backgrounds of the defendants while others such as Lebanon, have muktalataa(h) (mixed jurisdiction) courts based on religious sects and residual foreign legal systems enhanced by Sharia. 129 In this regard, some Western governments such as the United Kingdom are also considering the notion of permitting Muslims to apply Islamic law in commercial, family, and financial conflicts. 130 However, others, such as the state governments of Oklahoma and North Carolina in the United States, are in favor of banning the use of Sharia law in litigation. 
Islamic Business Law: Sharia and Modern Economics, any Clashes?
Islamic business law, including banking and finance, works as an international industrial tool that changes and adjusts to modern commercial and business practices while being consistent with Sharia law rules and objectives. 132 Scholars argue that "Islamic finance is a way to put Islamic principles about the economy into practice." 133 Two foremost financial rules that appear recurrently in the Quran'ic texts and Sunnah's teachings are proscriptions against ribaa(h) (usury or interest) and gharar (excessive 134 It should be noted that ingenious twists on customary and ordinary fiscal and monetary products such as savings and checking accounts, credit cards, banking loans, mortgages, loans, stocks, sukuk (bonds), and others financial instruments evade the classical business ideal.
135 Some of the morally-minded are also switching to Sharia-compliant investments, securities, and some entrepreneurs are evading forbidden transactions such as trading in hedonistic industries like pornography.
136 By dealing with Sharia-compliant entities stakeholders are ensuring that their cash will not end up sponsoring what they consider immoral activities.
137 Some current Islamic governments are looking to launch Sharia-compliant financial devices that do not conflict with Islamic values. 
Islamic Criminal Law: Do Islamic Penalties Conflict with Principles of Equality and Human Rights?
In Islamic criminal Sharia law, there are three categories of criminal acts. 139 The first includes Quesas (equivalence) and Diyyaa(h) (compensational) offenses which state that an individual who has committed a specified criminal act will be punished in the same way and by the same means that she used in hurting the other person. The second category is hudud (fixed) offenses, those that are prescribed an explicit and precise punishment in the Quran. 141 There are seven hadd criminal acts: fornication, drinking alcoholic beverages, theft, apostasy (with some debate), highway robbery, defamation and slander, and rebellion against legitimate authority. 142 Punishments for these offenses cannot be applied unless the strict conditions of their application have been fulfilled.
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Ta'azir is the third group of misconducts in Islamic law, which includes all wrongdoings for which Sharia does not propose a punishment.
144 Sanctions for these crimes emerge from the discretionary power delegated to the Qadi (judge). 145 Notwithstanding official unwillingness to use hudud punishments, honor (family) killings-reprisals for bringing dishonor on one's family-pubertal (young) zawajs (marriages), polygamy, gender mixture and gender equality, and inheritance rules, all of which are universal in Muslim countries, are still in debate. The top country-specific priority of Western governments, especially the United States, for Egypt, is the existence of a constitutional document based on the rule of law, guaranteeing human rights including minorities' and women's rights; thus, for these nations and according to this Article's stance: the Constitution cannot be based on a misinterpretation and misapplication of Islamic law. 150 The recent debates on the Egyptian Constitution have focused on economic consequences, women's rights (electoral representation and employment rights, for example), ensuring religious freedom, maintaining stability without constant terrorist activities, and overall noticeable progress for the social and economic health of the country. ("Ijtihad is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 153 Under former President Anwar el-Sādāt, in 1980, the Egyptian government amended article 2 of the Constitution to read "principles of the Islamic Sharia are the principal source[s] of legislation," and this provision can be clearly understood as a Sharia Guarantee Clause. 154 In this regard, the Court held it had no jurisdiction over article 2 remedies or challenges to legislation that had already been enacted or in force at the time the article was endorsed, but it did have authority to hear challenges and disputes to any laws passed afterwards. 155 The ruling of the High (Supreme) Court seems to have confirmed that the government's new obligations to Islam did not exclude the sort of liberalization that the justices were trying to stimulate through their decisions around this time. Meanwhile, Egypt's Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood) continuously struggled with that notion and claimed that only "customarily trained" scholars can be trusted for interpreting Islamic law rules-yet many of their leaders had no traditional training and have minimal knowledge about the basics of Islamic law. 156 Most significantly, the Court used a technique and process that was deeply indebted to substantial modernization, but one that also made signals towards more traditional approaches and classical methods of interpretation.
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In a landmark judgment, the Court elucidated these "principles" and defined them as the "Sharia injunctions, which are peremptory in proof (of [Vol. 24:4 origin) and significance," 158 slightly restraining the likelihood of judicial and governmental application of the variety of understandings and rulings that date back to the tenth century (extreme and radical Islamism). Moreover, the Court stated that the constitutional provision in question was addressed to lawmakers (not to justices) and that it was not applicable retroactively on prevailing laws. 159 Further, the Court pointed out "that Islam and its whole rules must be interpreted to be consistent and in conformity with liberal standards comprising not only contractual, commercial, maritime, labour, property and other daily transactions but also human rights, including women and minority rights." 160 The Supreme Constitutional Court-and now many Egyptian intellectuals and political figures-have come to see the Islamic Sharia as suitable and relevant to modern positive law in two manners. First, the Sharia is based on definite common objectives or maqasid/darouriat (such as the protection of life, lineage, property, religion, and prosperity), a concept which appeared from medieval classical jurisprudence. These objectives should guide legal experts and Muslim Ulm'aa/Fuqha'aa (jurists) in defining and formulating the law in difficult circumstances, but also, progressively, by non-experts who claim that the maqasid have to be extended beyond tradition to contain objectives like freedom. 161 Second, regarding the diversity in Islamic orthodox legal traditions, it is agreed that a small number of rulings founded in the primary sources are accurate and verified (ahkamm qat'h al-sbout wa al-delalah) such that they cannot reasonably be disclaimed and hence must be followed. 162 After Mubarak's overthrow, the Muslim Brotherhood dominated the parliamentary elections and won the presidential election, and some members anticipated modifying Egyptian law to permit the legislature to override the Supreme Constitutional Court-causing much tension between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Court, and the general public. 163 The new Constitution that had been written involved a handful of Islamists, making it vulnerable to comparable charges of excluding or eliminating. The new Charter emphasizes exactly the correlation between state and religion and confirms religion's separation from political scenes. 165 This document eradicates all religious references and vague language including the term "public morals" which now represents a new form of guarantees and protections for women and religious minorities. 166 Personal and familial status is completely based on Sharia law and issues related to adoption, inheritance, or guardianship apply to non-Muslims as well. 167 Most notably, article 2 and its complement 219 had an overwhelming effect on Egypt under Morsi, which implicitly converted the national identity of the country to a theocracy and could be used to justify the treatment of non-Muslims as second class citizens and set the groundwork for the process of the Islamization of the nation. 168 Although 164 . In other words, the Court can keep its substantially moderate jurisprudence only insofar as it can persuasively make an argument for it in terms that fundamentalists and traditional modernists will approve. For more information on these articles, see Clark B. The Preamble to the Constitution also favors the secular and liberal elements without referring to any definition of Islamic Sharia, considering it sufficient to state that the "definition of Islamic Sharia must follow rulings issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court," and giving the high court exclusive authority to "interpret constitutional articles in its rulings" as explained. 175 The dreadful article 219 of the de facto 2012 Constitution stipulated that "[t]he principles of Islamic Sharia [by definition] include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community."
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The religious clause, especially the Sharia Clause Guarantee, raised an inquiry regarding the standing of other Islamic doctrines and scholarships in Egyptian law, and gave an instrument for radical Islamists to restrict public freedoms and favor only one conservative, Sunni, jurisprudential linguistic interpretation over other doctrinal fiqh (opinions). 177 The explicit term "principles" gave policymakers and legislators so much flexibility that they could almost apply the predominant positive laws-based on European and Napoleonic civil law-without any inconsistency with the "main principles" of Islamic (Sharia) law. 178 Furthermore, the Preamble obviously detailed that "Egypt is now writing a Constitution that complements the construction of a modern democratic State, with a civilian government." 179 When Former Presidents Mubarak and Morsi were exiled from power in what became one of the crucial moments of the Arab Spring, an energetic public debate supervened about the character of the Egyptian society under the Constitution. For Egyptian citizens, after two remarkable uprisings, the new constitutional document had to guarantee the privileges of democracy and civil rights to all societal groups involved. In this phase of Egypt's Arab Spring to define the limitations of the Egyptian idea of democracy, the military would, in principle, not be involved in the political scene. However, when the values and principles of the State are at risk, the military could intervene-limited to setting things on the "right track" based on its historical and national responsibility. The intense and deep episode of Egyptian politics in the last few years devastated any presence of a genuine, smooth, and frank democratic transition. The preliminary social sensation surrounding Mubarak's overthrow gave the impression that Egypt was going toward an optimistic and bright democratic future. It was expected that with Mubarak's departure, most of Egypt's political impediments would vanish, as if the entire political, economic, social, and military configuration that empowered Mubarak to rule for such a long time-with an iron fist-was irrelevant. The legitimacy of the new Constitution will soon be put to a difficult test among the Egyptian general public.
The reality that the new Constitution replicates Egypt's contemporary overriding alliance is neither shocking nor novel. The structure of the preceding Islamist Constitution helped the coalition that ruled for a short time period, giving Morsi and the ruling Islamists an extensive base for inaugurating their theocratic plan. Still, the near future of Egypt's transition centers on whether the existing political coalition is more durable than the previous one. Based on the up-to-date economic statistics, the government will not be able to completely implement the Charter, and particularly within the prevailing economic status quo the recent data points to the substantial peril of such massive State spending. 205 severe cash crisis that would expose food and fuel subsidies, harming huge sectors of the population and possibly lengthening support for antigovernment protests. 206 If the government attempts to evade these results by not following the new Constitution, Egypt will continue to lack the legal rationalism that any constant and stable political system requires.
In theory, the Constitution should be a step forward in Egypt's twisting transition. Yet, it is certainly problematic to state that the Constitution alone will end Egypt's polarization and political and economic crisis, and bring genuine and effective stability. Without a doubt, the new Egyptian Constitution, as inadequate as it is, represents an enhancement over the Islamist-backed theocratic Constitution. Egypt will not be a "Jeffersonian" democracy, 207 no matter who rules. Consequently, given the option between a liberal and secular régime dedicated to combating terrorism and standing by universal agreements, versus a dictatorial jihadist (religious fascism) rule that at best turned a blind eye to Islamist viciousness against Egyptian national citizens, the choice should be obvious.
Moreover, given the United States' interest in a secure and stable Egypt, moving towards operative civilian rule is arguably significant for part of the international community's security interests. Egypt needs a positive cultural attitude and the non-corruption of State bureaucracies, while being cautious in the upcoming years in selecting leaders who retain the dynamic for pure democratic values and self-motivated institutions. In Egypt, gradualism, more than anything, will be the political technique for allowing future generations to embrace democracy-building.
"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." -Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
